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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue which defendant is liable to a plaintiff in maritime litigation often
merely scratches the surface of the legal issues that will have to be addressed in
a final determination of which party or which insurer ultimately bears the cost
of any settlement or judgment. This is because of the plethora of contractual
relationships among what is often numerous participants in maritime operations.
As a result, contractual indemnity in maritime law is an area of extensive
litigation. This article addresses many of the issues that arise in litigating
indemnity obligations in the maritime setting.
The number of issues arising from a single indemnification provision in a
contract can be complex and may not be easily resolved by existing case law.
One of the most litigated issues in this area of the law is the threshold issue
whether maritime law will apply to a specific contract. The resolution of this
issue depends upon the nature of that contract. This issue is addressed in part
I. Part III addresses the type of language required in indemnification agree-
ments under Louisiana, Texas, and maritime law for those agreements to be
enforced to require an indemnitor to indemnify an indemnitee for the indemni-
tee's own negligence or fault. Part IV notes a statutory restriction on maritime
indemnification agreements and an exception to that restriction. Part V discusses
the situation that arises when more than one party agrees to defend and
indemnify an indemnitee. Whether a waiver of subrogation in a contract affects
rights of indemnity is discussed in part VI. Part VII outlines some particularly
complicated insurance issues that may arise in the maritime contractual indemnity
setting. Finally, a special appellate rule applicable to maritime indemnity claims
is pointed out in part VIII.
II. DOES MARITIME OR STATE LAW APPLY TO THE CONTRACT?
A. Maritime or Non-Maritime Nature of Contract
Perhaps the best starting point in an examination of contractual indemnity
in maritime law is, unfortunately, also a very troublesome analysis for the
practitioner. The issue whether a contract is maritime is most often litigated in
the context of marine oil and gas exploration or production. The resolution of
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that issue usually determines whether the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act'
or the Texas Oilfield Indemnity Act 2 will apply to negate or limit the indemnity
sought, or whether an indemnification agreement will be enforced under maritime
law.
When are activities maritime? The United States Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals has addressed this question in numerous decisions without supplying a
bright-line test. One need only examine recent Fifth Circuit opinions to see that
the court recognizes the difficulty in making the distinction between maritime
and non-maritime activities.
In 1990, Circuit Judge Alvin B. Rubin authored Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf
Oil Corp.3 and began by stating, "Whether a contract is or is not maritime in
nature is a quotidian issue whose resolution is governed by no broad rubric
discernable from the numerous decided cases."4 Likewise, Circuit Judge John
R. Brown began his opinion in Domingue v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co.5
approximately one year later by noting, "Once more we embark on a voyage
through the familiar marshland area of the law set aside for classifying the oil
and gas exploration services contract as wet or dry."6
Davis & Sons, Inc., Domingue, and Campbell v. Sonat Offshore Drilling,
Inc. 7 are an excellent trilogy to demonstrate the issues that arise in determining
whether a contract is maritime.
The court in Davis & Sons, Inc. warned, "For those looking for a bright line
delineating the boundary between maritime and non-maritime contracts, our
previous cases offer little assistance . . . ."8 Judge Rubin noted the following
specific factual circumstances previously addressed and ruled upon by the Fifth
Circuit, commenting that the rulings were "apparent inconsistencies": "Oil and
gas drilling on navigable waters aboard a vessel is recognized to be maritime
commerce";9 "a turnkey contract to drill an offshore well" is maritime;' ° "a
contract to furnish a casing crew to a submersible drilling barge [is] maritime in
nature";" and, in contrast, "[other case law] states that there is nothing
1. La. R.S. 9:2780 (1991).
2. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 127.003 (West 1993).
3. 919 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1990).
4. Id. at 313.
5. 923 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 874 (1992).
6. Id. at 393-94.
7. 979 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1992).
8. Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 919 F.2d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1990).
9. Id. (quoting Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1986)).
10. Id. (citing Lewis v. Glendel Drilling Co., 898 F.2d 1083 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 857, 112 S.' Ct. 171 (1991)).
11. Id. (citing Corbitt v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 654 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1981)). See
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Mobile Drilling Barge Mr. Charlie, 424 F.2d 684 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 400 U.S. 832, 91
S. Ct. 65 (1970); Halliburton Co. v. Norton Drilling Co., 302 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 829, 83 S. Ct. 1870 (1963).
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inherently maritime about the activities involved in offshore oil production."' 2
The court explained that the apparent inconsistent results were traceable to the
highly fact-specific inquiry required to classify activities as maritime. 3 The
court noted that while it could discern no single method of analysis in the many
cases addressing this subject, it would now articulate what it perceived as a
"fairly consistent underlying approach" used by the Fifth Circuit in these cases.
The court noted that often the contracts in dispute are comprised of two
separate components. First, there is some form of master service agreement that
usually includes a defense and indemnity agreement and other general terms
without referencing a specific job. Second, a supplementary contract, such as a
work order, is entered into which provides for the specific services requested.
The two documents must be interpreted together in evaluating whether maritime
or "land law" applies. 4 Such contracts may contain both maritime and non-
maritime obligations. "If separable maritime obligations are imposed by the
supplementary contracts, or work orders, these are 'maritime obligations [that]
can be separately enforced [in admiralty] without prejudice to the rest,' [and]
hence [are] subject to maritime law."'" If an injury occurs in the performance
of a separable maritime obligation (even though the blanket contract was
principally non-maritime) the complete contract is subject to maritime law. 6
After explaining this generalization, the Davis & Sons, Inc. court emphasized
that the classification of the contract as maritime depends on the "nature and
character of the contract," rather than on the place of execution or perfor-
mance.7 Furthermore, determination of the "nature of the contract" depends
in part on historical treatment in the jurisprudence and in part on a fact-specific
inquiry. 8
The six factors to be considered in characterizing a contract were identified
in Davis & Sons, Inc.:
1) what does the specific work order in effect at the time of the injury
provide? 2) what work did the crew assigned under the work order
actually do? 3) was the crew assigned to work aboard a vessel in
navigable waters[?] 4) to what extent did the work being done relate to
the mission of that vessel? 5) what was the principal work of the
12. Davis & Sons, Inc., 919 F.2d at 315 (citing Houston Oil & Minerals Corp. v. American
Int'l Tool Co., 827 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1067, 108 S. Ct. 1031 (1988);
Sohyde Drilling & Marine Co. v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 644 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1081, 102 S. Ct. 635 (1981)). See Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 105
S. Ct. 1421 (1985).
13. Davis & Sons, Inc., 919 F.2d at 315.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 315-16 (quoting Compagnie Francaise De Navigation A Vapeur v. Bonnasse, 19 F.2d
777, 779 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 551, 48 S. Ct. 114 (1927)).
16. Id. at 316 (citing Lefler v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 785 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1986)).
17. Id. (quoting North Pac. S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine Ry. & Shipbuilding Co., 249 U.S.
119, 125, 39 S. Ct. 221, 223 (1919)).
18. Id.
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injured worker? and 6) what work was the injured worker actually doing
at the time of injury?' 9
After establishing the analysis to be used, the Davis & Sons, Inc. court began its
"voyage through the familiar marshland" by examining the specific facts before
it.
Davis & Sons, Inc. (Davis), entered into a master service agreement with
Gulf Corporation to provide labor and general contracting services for onshore
and offshore facilities.20 Davis contended that approximately seventy percent
(70%) of the labor provided under the contract was land-based, and that the
contract's principal obligation was demonstrably non-maritime. The master
service agreement, however, did not specify any particular work to be performed
by Davis. It did include an indemnity clause.2'
The court expressly noted that even if most of the work under the contract
was land-based, the activities underway at the time of the accident at issue had
to be evaluated. Pursuant to work orders issued weekly, Davis supplied labor for
two barge crews and two individual pumpers to work in Black Bay Field.22
The self-propelled barges had spuds but no jack-up facilities. It had no quarters
and the crew was land-based. Any work performed on the barge was done either
while it was afloat or spudded down next to the small work platforms that
surrounded the producing wells in the field.
Brenaman, the decedent, was a Davis employee assigned to one of the
barges as a "pusher." His primary responsibility was to supervise other Davis
employees. The barge made daily maintenance runs throughout the field "to
make repairs, lay pipe, and work on flow lines; it also transported chemicals and
supplies. 23 Since the work platforms around the wellheads did not provide
adequate work space, the majority of service work was performed on the barge
itself. Davis employees also were responsible for such activities as painting,
inspecting and repairing equipment, and operating and navigating the barge.2"
The work order governing the period during which the accident occurred
provided only: "Vendor: Davis; Service Description: Labor Gang 11171.,,25
At the time of the accident, the crew was working on the barge while it was
spudded down adjacent to a fixed platform. The crew members were building
a walkway to be placed on a tank battery, filling a pollution tank with water, and
checking the tank for leaks. Brenaman was supervising the crew's work as well
19. Id.
20. Id. at 314.
21. Id. at 316.
22. Id. at 314.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
[Vol. 55
SUSAN A. DAIGLE and JAMES T. RIVERA
as fitting paneling for an office being built on the barge. He left the area and,
several hours later, was discovered drowned in nearby waters.26
The court, applying the six-factor analysis to these facts, concluded:
(Factor 1: Specific Work Order.) The service order did not specify
details of the assigned work, but simply assigned the crew to Barge
11171.27
(Factor 2: Actual Work Performed.) Employee time sheets indicate
that during the week in question the crew repaired leaks on wells and
tanks, repaired and replaced flowlines, transported materials, and built
a walkway.28
(Factor 3: Aboard a Vessel.) The crew traveled aboard the barge from
one site to another performing the majority of their work on the barge,
and the terrain and production equipment involved required the use of
a "special purpose vessel,"29 such as this barge, that could function as
a mobile work platform. Its transportation function was more than
"merely incidental" 30 to its primary purpose of serving as a work
platform.
(Factor 4: Relationship of the Work to the Mission of the Vessel.) The
mission of the vessel, therefore, was "to serve as a mobile maintenance
unit,"3 ' and in light of that function or mission, the crew attached to
that vessel served in a capacity that contributed to its mission. The
work done by the crew was inextricably intertwined with maritime
activities since it required the use of a vessel and its crew.
(Factor 5: Principal Work of the Injured Employee.) Brenaman's
principal work "was to supervise Davis' employees in the accomplish-
ment of the vessel's mission." 2 He had been assigned to the barge for
more than eighteen months, and performed a substantial part of his
work on the barge itself.
(Factor 6: Actual Work Being Performed When Injured.) He was
overseeing Davis' employees (the crew of the vessel) at the time of his
death and, additionally, temporarily helping to build an office on
board.33
The court then summarily concluded based upon this analysis that the entire
agreement specified in the work order for the work in question was a maritime
contract. Therefore, the indemnity agreement contained in the blanket contract
26. Id.
27. Id at 316.
28. Id. at 316-17.
29. Id. at 317.
30. Id. (quoting Sharp v. Johnson Bros. Corp., 917 F.2d 885, 888 (5th Cir. 1990)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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must be interpreted under maritime law. The court reversed the district judge's
ruling to the contrary?4
Approximately two months later, the Fifth Circuit again ruled upon a
classification of a contract as "wet or dry." In Domingue v. Ocean Drilling &
Exploration Co.,35 the court examined a blanket service contract between
Dimensional Oil Services, Inc. (Dimensional) and Ocean Drilling and Exploration
Company, Inc. (ODECO), and a subsequent oral work order requesting
Dimensional to perform wireline services on an ODECO jack-up drilling rig.
Domingue, a Gulf Coast Well Tester employee, was performing well testing
services unrelated to Dimensional's wireline operations when he sustained
injuries after tripping over a piece of equipment placed on the rig's deck by the
Dimensional crew. Domingue filed suit against ODECO and later joined
Dimensional. ODECO filed a cross-claim against Dimensional seeking
indemnity under the 1983 blanket contract.
36
Judge Brown acknowledged this case was identical in several respects to
Davis & Sons, Inc. However, he noted two major distinctions. First, in Davis
& Sons, Inc., indemnity was sought for claims made by representatives of an
employee of Davis, the indemnitor. In Domingue, the injured party was not an
employee of Dimensional, the indemnitor, and his work was unrelated to
Dimensional's wireline operation.3 ' The second difference, which the court
believed even more significant, was that in Davis & Sons, Inc., Davis was
required to perform the maintenance work in question "primarily through the use
of self-propelled work barges.3a In contrast, "Dimensional supplie[d] no vessel
as such when executing an ODECO work order" (although jack-up rigs are
judicially characterized as vessels). 39 Guided by Davis & Sons, Inc., the court
devoted the majority of its opinion to the fact-specific application of the six-
factor analysis to the Dimensional-ODECO contract and activities. The analysis,
in pertinent part, was as follows:
(Factor 1: Specific Work Order.) Dimensional's sole obligation under
the work order was to perform wireline services. ODECO requested no
other services.'
(Factor 2: Actual Work Performed.) It was undisputed that only
wireline operations, and no other work, were performed by the
Dimensional crew on the pertinent dates of September 14-15, 1987.:
34. Id
35. 923 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033, 112 S. Ct. 874 (1992).
36. Id. at 394-95.
37. Id at 395.
38. Id. (citing Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 919 F.2d 313, 314 (5th Cir. 1990)).
39. Id.
40. Id at 396.
41. Id.
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(Factor 3: Aboard a Vessel.) Wireline operations were performed
exclusively on a single jack-up drilling unit, which has been character-
ized as a vessel.4 2
(Factor 4: Relationship of the Work to the Mission of the Vessel.) This
factor garnered the most in-depth analysis. The court immediately
noted "[iut should no longer be open to dispute that wireline services are
peculiar to the oil and gas industry and, viewed apart from the
circumstances under which they are performed, are distinctly non-
maritime in nature."4 3 Furthermore, the Dimensional-ODECO contract
did not become maritime simply because the wireline services per-
formed under the contract were aboard a vessel. The court cited Davis
& Sons, Inc. for the proposition whether a contract is maritime
"depends on the 'nature and character of the contract' rather than on its
place of execution or performance." The court went on to note that
a contract would take on a salty flavor when the performance of the
contract is more than incidentally related to the execution of the vessel's
mission, and discussed how this distinction was addressed previously by
the Thurmond v. Delta Well Surveyors45 court."
In Thurmond, the Fifth Circuit determined that in analyzing a
contract to provide a work barge and crew to perform wireline services
42. Id. (citing Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959); Houston Oil & Minerals
Corp. v. American Int'l Tool Co., 827 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1067, 108
S. Ct. 1031 (1988)). See also Vickers v. Chiles Drilling Co., 822 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1987); Wallace
v. Oceaneering Int'l, 727 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1984).
43. Domingue v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 923 F.2d 393, 396 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1033, 112 S. Ct. 874 (1992) (citing Thurmond v. Delta Well Surveyors, 836 F.2d
952, 955-56 (5th Cir. 1988)). The court acknowledged in footnote 6 that Thurmond did not mention
the Fifth Circuit's earlier opinions of Pippen v. Shell Oil Co., 661 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1981) and
Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 664 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g en banc, 680 F.2d 1034
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170, 103 S. Ct. 815 (1983), which held "offshore wireline
services were maritime in nature." Domingue, 923 F.2d at 396 n.6. In Pippen, the Fifth Circuit
opined:
Since offshore drilling ... is maritime commerce, it follows that the purpose of Pippen's
[wireline operations] work was to facilitate maritime commerce.... [W]e are [therefore]
compelled to conclude that the work performed by Pippen had a realistically significant
relationship to maritime commerce. Thus, Pippen was engaged in maritime employment
at the time of his injury.
Pippen, 661 F.2d at 384 (footnote omitted).
The Domingue court noted the vitality of the Pippen-Boudreaux holdings may continue to be in
doubt after the Supreme Court's decision in Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414,418-19, 105
S. Ct. 1421, 1424-25 (1985), in which the Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's expansive view
of maritime employment in decisions such as Pippen and Boudreaux. Domingue, 923 F.2d at 396
n.6.
44. Domingue, 923 F.2d at 396 (quoting Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 919 F.2d 313,
316 (5th Cir. 1990)).
45. 836 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1988).
46. Domingue, 923 F.2d at 396-97.
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"the use of the work barge was only incidental to the performance of
the contract. 4 7 Thurmond distinguished itself from Theriot v. Bay
Drilling Corp.,4 in which the Fifth Circuit determined that "a contract
to furnish the equipment, materials, supplies, and services necessary to
drill an oil well was maritime because the supply of a vessel was
central to the contract."49 The court noted the supply of a vessel was
central to the contract in Theriot, but the contract in Thurmond did not
require the contractor to provide a vessel (although the court acknowl-
edged the contract may have even contemplated the hiring of vessels
and seamen). The court cited Thurmond's conclusion that the use of a
vessel was, at best, incidental to the performance of the contract.50
The court determined that the Domingue facts were more analogous
to Thurmond. ODECO owned and provided the jack-up rig. The
Dimensional employees used this vessel merely as a work platform to
execute the wireline services. The Domingue court therefore concluded,
"The fact of the [jack-up rig] being a vessel is nothing more than
incidental to its purpose here of serving as a work platform for the
execution of this particular service contract."'"
(Factors 5 & 6: The Work of the Injured Employee.) The second
distinction between Davis & Sons, Inc. and Domingue, that the injured
party was not an employee of Dimensional nor was his work related to
Dimensional's wireline operations, became significant for the applica-
tion of these two factors. Under Davis & Sons, Inc., these factors aided
in classifying the contract as maritime because as an employee of the
party performing the services under the contract, the work performed by
the employee would help define the nature of the contract. In contrast,
in Domingue the work performed by the injured party was immaterial
to defining the Dimensional-ODECO contract because the injured party
was performing well-testing operations as an employee of a third party.
Therefore, the court determined that Davis & Sons, Inc. factors five and
six had little, if any, relevance.52
Left with'the other applicable factors, the Domingue court held Thurmond
was controlling, and the Dimensional-ODECO service contract was non-
maritime.53 The Fifth Circuit again reversed the lower court, which had
reached an opposite conclusion. For practitioners, Domingue appeared to provide
an outline of the analysis the Fifth Circuit mandated for future use. This outline
47. Id. at 397 (citing Thurmond, 836 F.2d at 956) (emphasis added).
48. 783 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1986).
49. Domingue, 923 F.2d at 397 (citing Theriot, 783 F.2d at 538-39).
50. Id.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 398.
53. Id
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consisted of taking the six Davis & Sons, Inc. factors and applying them to the
facts of each case/contract. The "rules of the game" were set, but along came
Campbell v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc.' and, to quote a prominent American
auto manufacturer, "the rules [appear to] have changed."
In Campbell, Union Texas Petroleum Corporation (UTP) contracted with
Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc. (Sonat) to drill a well on the outer continental shelf
off the coast of Louisiana utilizing Sonat's drilling vessel, the Offshore Taurus.
Additionally, UTP entered into an agreement with Frank's Casing Crew and
Rental Tools, Inc. (Frank's) for Frank's to provide drive pipe, hammer work, and
casing services for the project. Campbell, a member of Frank's casing crew, was
injured as he attempted to transfer from the M/V Trudy Bruce, a transport vessel,
to Sonat's drilling vessel. 55
The court first addressed the preliminary issue whether the agreement
between UTP and Frank's constituted a contract. 56 The court then considered
the issue whether the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) was
applicable. The court noted the district court had focused on the second prong
of the three-part test used to determine the applicability of the OCSLA.57
Under the test used to decide whether state law applies under the OCSLA as set
forth in Smith v. Penrod Drilling Corp. ," the second factor requires that federal
54. 979 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1992).
55. Id. at 1117-18.
56. The agreement in question was a purchase order issued to Frank's by UTP thirteen days
after the accident occurred. The court noted Frank's had admitted a contract existed between the
parties. Further:
(1) UTP and Frank's [had] conducted business on a regular, continuous basis for years[;]
(2) it [was] common practice between UTP and Frank's for individual purchase orders to
postdate the services rendered[;] (3) the basic indemnity language in these UTP-Frank's
contracts [had] remained constant[;] and (4) as for the specific contract at issue, UTP paid
Frank's in accordance with the contract's terms and Frank's accepted that payment
without objection.
Id. at 1119-20. Therefore, since the parties shared a history of business dealings and since
standardized provisions were part of those dealings, the provisions were binding when accepted
without objection. Id. at 1120 (citing Grillet v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 927 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir.
1991); MN American Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483, 1488-89 (9th Cir.
1983); Hudson Waterways Corp. v. Coastal Marine Serv., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 597, 604-05 (E.D. Tex.
1977)).
57. To determine whether state law applies under the OCSLA, the following test has been
established by the Fifth Circuit:
[F]or adjacent state law to apply as surrogate federal law under OCSLA, three conditions
are significant. (1) The controversy must arise on a situs covered by OCSLA (i.e. the
subsoil, seabed, or artificial structures permanently or temporarily attached thereto). (2)
Federal maritime law must not apply of its own force. (3) The state law must not be
inconsistent with Federal law.
Id. (quoting Smith v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 960 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1992)). See also Rodrigue
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355-56, 89 S. Ct. 1835, 1837-38 (1969); Hollier v.
Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 972 F.2d 662, 664 (5th Cir. 1992).
58. 960 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1992).
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maritime law must not apply of its own force. The Fifth Circuit in Campbell
stated the district court focused on this factor by "[a]pplying a two part test
introduced by the Fifth Circuit in [Davis & Sons, Inc.] to determine whether a
contract is maritime." 59
Campbell might be considered somewhat confusing not only because it
determined after Thurmond and Domingue that providing certain oilfield services
is a maritime activity, but arguably also because of its description and application
of the Davis & Sons, Inc. test. Why was the Fifth Circuit, for the first time,
referring to the Davis & Sons, Inc. test as "two part"? In the four decisions
rendered between Davis & Sons, Inc. and CampbelP on the issue of a maritime
versus non-maritime contract, the Fifth Circuit made no reference to a two-part
test. However, Davis & Sons, Inc. did preface the six factors delineated therein
by stating, "Determination of the nature of a contract depends in part on
historical treatment in the jurisprudence and in part on a fact-specific inquiry. ' '61
Davis & Sons, Inc., however, appears not to provide any comparison of its facts
to historical treatment in the jurisprudence in the text of the opinion.62
Campbell implies that the Davis & Sons, Inc. language creates a two-part test:
(1) historical treatment in the jurisprudence; and (2) a fact-specific inquiry using
the six-factor analysis.63
The Fifth Circuit decisions prior to Campbell, arguably, did not interpret the
Davis & Sons, Inc. language to set up such a two-part test. Domingue
summarized the Davis & Sons, Inc. language by stating: "[It] set forth six
factors which [were] crystallized from this Circuit's jurisprudence directing the
fact-specific inquiry . . . ."64 In Smith65 and Hollier,66 the opinions simply
stated, "In determining whether a contract is maritime, this court in Davis &
Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp. outlined the following test," and proceeded to quote
the six factors. At the district court level in Hollier, the district court explained
the Davis & Sons, Inc. language as follows:
59. Campbell v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 979 F.2d 1115, 1120-21 (5th Cir. 1992)
(emphasis added).
60. See Hollier v. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 972 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1992) (ruling dated Sept.
23, 1992); Dupont v. Sandefer Oil & Gas, Inc., 963 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1992) (ruling dated June 2,
1992); Smith v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 960 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1992) (ruling dated Apr. 30, 1992);
Domingue v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 923 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1033, 112 S. Ct. 874 (1992) (ruling dated Feb. 11, 1991).
61. Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 919 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1990).
62. Id.
63. Campbell, 979 F.2d at 1121 ("In accordance with the first part of the Davis test, the district
court looked to this court's established jurisprudence and found precedent .... The district court
then applied the fact-specific inquiry prescribed in Davis .....
64. Domingue, 923 F.2d at 395.
65. Smith v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 960 F.2d 456, 460.(5th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
66. Hollier v. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 972 F.2d 662, 665 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation
omitted).
[Vol. 55
SUSAN A. DAIGLE and JAMES T. RIVERA
In [Davis & Sons, Inc.] the court reviewed the jurisprudence in this area
of the law and listed the six factors considered to be controlling in
making the determination of whether or not the work done under an oil
well service contract embracing onshore and offshore drilling and
production activities is or is not maritime in character. 67
Review of the text of these opinions indicates that, at least prior to
Campbell, the test did not consist of two separate parts. The court appeared to
apply the Davis & Sons, Inc.'s six factors as a single prong. The "in part on
historical treatment in the jurisprudence" and "in part on a fact-specific inquiry"
language in Davis & Sons, Inc. was apparently presumed to mean that relevant
jurisprudence and the specific facts of each case were both considered together
under each of the six factors.
Arguably, Dupont v. Sandefer Oil & Gas, Inc. 69 is most in line with
Campbell's emphasis on historical treatment in the jurisprudence. In Dupont, the
court did not refer to the applicable test as having two parts. In fact, the six-
factor analysis was not even applied. The Dupont court only discussed prior
jurisprudence in determining that a contract to provide a vessel for use in drilling
and workover services was maritime.70 The court cited Smith v. Penrod
Drilling Corp.71 as controlling because it stood for the proposition that the use
of a jack-up rig was incidental to the completion of a well. The court noted that
both Thurmond and Domingue relied heavily on the fact that the contracts at
issue in those cases did not require a vessel to be provided; thus, furnishing a
vessel could not have been a principal obligation of either contract. 72
In any event, the Campbell court, upon discerning the test as two-part, relied
on Corbitt v. Diamond M. Drilling Co. 73 to conclude that providing casing
services had previously been considered by the court to be maritime in nature.
The Campbell court pointed out74 that Corbitt was cited (along with many other
cases) in a footnote in Davis & Sons, Inc. (at a point where the Davis & Sons,
Inc. court was apparently making the point that prior jurisprudence on the issue
of maritime versus non-maritime contract was confusing).75
The court apparently gave great weight to the "historical treatment in the
jurisprudence" accorded to casing services by Corbitt. The court supported its
reliance on Corbitt by stating: "It has been long established that a legally
67. Hollier v. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 765 F. Supp. 330, 332 (W.D. La. 1991).
68. See Domingue, 923 F.2d at 396-97 (analyzing jurisprudence under factor (4)); Smith, 960
F.2d at 460 (analyzing jurisprudence under factors (1), (3), and (5)).
69. 963 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1992).
70. Id. at 62.
71. 960 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1992).
72. Dupont, 963 F.2d at 62. The court obviously believed furnishing a vessel was still a vital
consideration by continuing to list it as a factor in subsequent decisions.
73. 654 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1981).
74. Campbell v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 979 F.2d 1115, 1121 (5th Cir. 1992).
75. Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 919 F.2d 313, 315 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1990).
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indistinguishable decision of this court must be followed by other panels of this
court and district courts unless overruled en banc or by the United States Supreme
Court.' '76 The court specifically rejected the argument that Herb's Welding had
impliedly overruled Corbitt. The court construed the rejection by the United States
Supreme Court in Herb's Welding of the circuit's expansive views of maritime
employment, regarding activities associated with the exploration and development
of oil and gas, as limited to platform related activities."
Notably, the six-factor analysis was contained within one paragraph in
Campbell, as compared to occupying almost half the text of the Domingue opinion.
The court was apparently not persuaded by the following analysis of the Davis &
Sons, Inc. factors and comparison with the Domingue analysis of these factors
which was included in appellant's brief to the court: 78
Domingue
1. The specific work order:
To provide wireline
services aboard the
Conquest (rather
than a contract to provide
or operate any vessel)
2. Actual work performed:
Only wireline services
were performed aboard
the ODECO rig.
3. Aboard a vessel?
Campbell
To provide hammer
operations aboard the
Ocean Taurus,
hammering drive pipe into
the subsoil (rather than a
contract to provide or
operate any vessel)
Only hammer services
were performed aboard
the Taurus.
The wireline services The hammer services
were performed exclusively were performed exclu-
on the Ocean Conquest, sively on the Taurus,
a jack-up drilling unit a movable jack-up drilling
unit.
4. Relationship of the work to the mission of the vessel:
The wireline services were The hammer operations
distinctly non-maritime in were distinctly non-
nature. The fact that the maritime in nature. The
Ocean Conquest was a fact that the Taurus
vessel was nothing more was a vessel was
76. Campbell, 979 F.2d at 1121 n.8 (citing, for example, Sturgeon v. Strachan Shipping Co.,
698 F.2d 798, 800 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 883, 105 S. Ct. 251 (1984); United States
v. Kirk, 528 F.2d 1057, 1063 (5th Cir. 1976)).
77. Id.
78. Brief of Appellants at 20-21, Campbell v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 979 F.2d 1115 (5th
Cir. 1992) (No. 91-4934).
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than incidental to the per- nothing more than
formance of the wireline incidental to the perfor-
services on the Ocean mance of the hammer
Conquest. services on the Taurus.
5. Principal work of the injured worker.
Not applicable. Felix Campbell was a
welder (as was the worker
in Herb's Welding)-a
traditionally non-
maritime activity.
6. Work the injured worker was engaged in:
Not applicable. Felix Campbell was
transferring, by personnel
basket, to the Taurus
preparatory to beginning
his work. He was not
engaged in the operation
of any vessel.
Later in the opinion, the court distinguished Domingue from the facts in
Campbell on several bases. In Domingue, the vessel had merely served as a work
platform. The court then noted, "Although it is conceivable that a vessel such as
[the jack-up rig in Campbell] may be used as a mere work platform .... this is not
the case before US." 7 9 The court had also noted the wireline services performed
in Domingue were only incidentally related to the mission of the vessel. In
contrast, the court pointed out that Campbell and the rest of the crew performed
their work from a vessel whose mission was to drill oil and gas wells. The work
performed was "inextricably intertwined with maritime activities since it required
the use of a vessel and its crew."80 The Campbell court focused on the use of the
equipment that was part of the drilling vessel (e.g., derrick and draw works) to
complete the casing crew's operations.
The parameters of this distinction would appear likely to be the focus of much
attention in future litigation on the issue of maritime versus non-maritime contracts.
How far this distinction can be stretched would appear to be an obvious concern.
What work in future cases will be determined to be inextricably intertwined with
maritime activities due to the use of a vessel and crew, and what work will be
considered only incidentally related to the mission of the vessel?
What direction have the decisions taken since Campbell? Has the Fifth Circuit
been consistent in its analysis after its apparent reclassification of the Davis & Sons,
Inc.'s test as two-part? What interpretation have the district courts given the
Campbell decision?
79. Campbell, 979 F.2d at 1123 (citation omitted).
80. Id. (quoting Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 919 F.2d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1990)).
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Logically, one could assume after Campbell that we now have a two-part test,
at least in personal injury cases-or do we? In Dupre v. Penrod Drilling Corp.,"
the only Fifth Circuit opinion rendered since Campbell on this issue, the Fifth
Circuit failed to refer to the Davis & Sons, Inc.'s test as two-part. The court simply
combined its analysis of "historical treatment in the jurisprudence" within the six-
factor analysis. Additionally, the court once again dedicated a substantial portion
of its opinion to this six-factor analysis.
Judge Putnam of the Western District of Louisiana recently ruled on a Motion
for Reconsideration in Hodgen v. Forest Oil Corp.82 and appeared to follow the
two-part analysis by evaluating the historical treatment in the jurisprudence
independently from the six-factor analysis. In Freeport McMoRan Resource
Partners, Ltd. Partnership v. Kremco, Inc.,3 Judge Livaudais determined that the
six-factor test set forth in Davis & Sons, Inc. used to determine whether a contract
is maritime applies only in cases involving personal injury.
The confusion in the case law regarding how the maritime/non-maritime
distinction is made should serve as notice that the six-factor Davis & Sons, Inc.
analysis may not always be conclusive in determining the nature of the contract.
The practitioner must be aware that the existence of "historical jurisprudence" from
the previous "marshland" of cases may result in a court emphasizing the historical
treatment in the jurisprudence over the six-factor analysis.
Perhaps Judge Smith, in Smith v. Penrod Drilling Corp., stated the current
situation best:
After Herb's Welding, our cases that propound the maritime nature of
offshore drilling-related contracts have been limited to their facts. In each
new case, a panel of this court must comb through a bewildering array of
cases that rely upon inconsistent reasoning in the hope of finding an
identical fact situation. Absent en banc reconciliation, cases thus are
decided on what seems to be a random factual basis."
B. Application of State Law Under OCSLA
Whether maritime law or state law will apply to a contract may be determined
by the application of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).g5 The
OCSLA mandates that adjacent state law be declared the law of the United States
81. 993 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1993).
82. 862 F. Supp. 1560 (W.D. La. 1994).
83. 827 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 n.2 (E.D. La. 1993).
84. Smith v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 960 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The
court also quoted Lewis v. Glendale Drilling Co., 898 F.2d 1083, 1084 (5th Cir. 1990), for the
following proposition: "[Blecause of an apparently contradictory line of cases in our circuit and the
uncertain policy underpinning our result, the appellant would justly ask 'why?.' Smith, 960 F.2d at
461.
85. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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for controversies arising on a situs such as the subsoil, seabed, or artificial structure
permanently or temporarily attached thereto.M To determine whether the OCSLA
applies, the Fifth Circuit has developed a three-prong test: "(1) The controversy
must arise on a situs covered by [the] OCSLA... [;] (2) Federal maritime law must
not apply of its own force[; and] (3) The state law must not be inconsistent with
Federal law."87
The factual circumstances of a recently decided district court opinion provide
an appropriate setting for a brief discussion of the test for the application of the
OCSLA to a contractual indemnity claim. In Hodgen v. Forest Oil Corp.,88 the
plaintiff was injured after making a swing rope transfer from a fixed platform on
the outer continental shelf off the coast of Louisiana onto a vessel to be transported
to another field platform in the Gulf of Mexico. The work of the plaintiff and his
crew was performed on a fixed platform. 89 Hodgen determined that only the first
two factors warranted discussion since the Fifth Circuit has expressly held in
previously applying the third factor that the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act
was not inconsistent with federal law when applied to contractual disputes arising
under the OCSLA.9°
In applying the first factor, the Hodgen court addressed prior jurisprudential
interpretation of the situs requirement. Union Texas Petroleum v. PLT Engineer-
ing9' and Domingue v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co.,92 were cited by the
court to emphasize that a vessel's use in carrying out a contract is not determina-
tive. 93 Union Texas Petroleum stressed that "the OCSLA situs requirement is met
when the location where a substantial amount of work under the contract is done
[is] on covered situses."' 4 A previous Fifth Circuit decision in Hollier v. Union
Texas Petroleum Corp.95 had held that the OCSLA situs requirement was met
because the plaintiff was "in physical contact with the platform at the time of his
injury." The defendants in Hodgen attempted to argue, based upon this
language, that contact with the seabed or a platform was necessary to meet the situs
requirement. They contended that since the accident occurred entirely on a vessel,
there was no controversy arising on an OCSLA situs that could implement the
Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act. The Hodgen court chose to regard the
86. Id. § 1333 (1988)!
87. Smith, 960 F.2d at 459. See also Union Tex. Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Eng'r, 895 F.2d
1043, 1047 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 848, 111 S. Ct. 136 (1990).
88. 862 F. Supp. 1560 (W.D. La. 1994).
89. Id. at 1562.
90. Id. at 1564-65. See Doucet v. Gulf Oil Corp., 783 F.2d 518, 525-26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 883, 107 S. Ct. 272 (1986); Matte v. Zapata Offshore Co., 784 F.2d 628, 630 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 872, 107 S. Ct. 247 (1986).
91. 895 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 848, 111 S. Ct. 136 (1990).
92. 923 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033, 112 S. Ct. 874 (1992).
93. Hodgen v. Forest Oil Corp., 862 F. Supp. 1560, 1565-66 (W.D. La. 1994).
94. lId at 1566 (citing Union Tex. Petroleum, 895 F.2d at 1047-48).
95. 972 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1992).
96. Id. at 665.
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Hollier language, at best, as dicta and followed the Union Texas Petroleum rule of
law regarding the situs requirement.
97
In the text of his opinion, Judge Putnam distinguished application of maritime
law to the tort claim from the proper law to be applied to the contractual claim. He
noted there were separate controversies in the case, one involving the maritime tort
claim of the plaintiff against the vessel owner and charterer, and the second
controversy arising from the application of the indemnification provisions of a
contract for platform services. The first prong of the three-prong test mandating
that the controversy must arise on a situs covered by the OCSLA was met, since the
work performed under the contract was on a covered situs. He then concluded in
applying the second prong of the test that maritime law did not apply of its own
force, the test for applying the OCSLA was met, and Louisiana law and the
Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act applied.98
C. Choice-of-Law Provisions
Which law will govern the interpretation of a contract may be determined by
a choice-of-law provision in the contract. Stoot v. Fluor Drilling Services, Inc.
99
addressed this issue. In Stoot, an employee of a drilling contractor sued the drilling
contractor for injuries that resulted from an attack on the employee by an employee
of the rig's caterer. The drilling contractor sought indemnity from the caterer
pursuant to the catering contract.
The district court relied on Lfler v. Atlantic Richfield Co."0 to determine
that the contract was maritime in nature.' The district court then ruled,
following Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp.,' °2 that maritime law should govern the
interpretation of the indemnity agreement.0 3 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted
that the district court's analysis of the maritime nature of the catering contract was
correct. However, the Stoot court stated, "[I]t does not automatically follow that
maritime law applies."'" The court noted that the contract contained a Louisiana
choice-of-law provision. Thereafter, the court explained:
In the absence of a choice of law clause, the construction of indemnity
provisions in a contract involving maritime obligations is governed by
maritime law. However, under admiralty law, where the parties have
97. Hodgen, 862 F. Supp. at 1566.
98. Id. at 1566-67.
99. 851 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir. 1988).
100. 785 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1986).
101. Stoot, 851 F.2d at 1517 (citing Lefler v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 785 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir.
1986), which held a catering services contract includes maritime obligations when the contractor
agrees to provide household services to barges or other seagoing vessels).
102. 783 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding the construction of indemnity provisions in maritime
contracts is governed by maritime law).
103. Stoot, 851 F.2d at 1517.
104. Uat
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included a choice of law clause, that state's law will govern unless [1] the
state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction or [2]
the state's law conflicts with the fundamental purposes of maritime
law. 105
The State of Louisiana was determined to have a substantial relationship to the
parties in this case. One party was qualified to do business in Louisiana. More
importantly, the party seeking protection of Louisiana law was a Louisiana
corporation. The court noted that Louisiana had declared a strong interest in
protecting resident independent contractors from the inequities of indemnity clauses
that require the contractor to indemnify the vessel owner against its own negli-
gence."°
Recently, two decisions have addressed choice-of-law provisions and the effect
such provisions may ultimately have on the obligations alleged to be imposed upon
the parties by an indemnity agreement. Both decisions, Campbell v. Sonat Offshore
Drilling, Inc.'°7 and Dupre v. Penrod Drilling Corp.,"' cite Stoot in support of
maritime law enforcing state choice-of-law provisions." 9 In Campbell, the
indemnity contract between Union Texas Petroleum and Frank's Casing Crew
contained a Texas choice-of-law clause. The Fifth Circuit applied the Stoot test and
concluded that because Union Texas Petroleum was headquartered in Texas, there
was a substantial relationship between the contracting parties and Texas. The court
further concluded the application of Texas law would not conflict with the
fundamental purpose of maritime law."0 Likewise, in Dupre, the contract also
contained a Texas choice-of-law provision. The parties had further stipulated that
if the contract was determined to be maritime, Texas law would govern."' The
court did not discuss the relationship of the parties to the State of Texas since the
parties had agreed if the contract was maritime the indemnity agreement would be
governed by Texas law pursuant to the choice-of-law provision in the contract.
III. INTERPRETATION OF INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS UNDER LOUISIANA, TEXAS,
AND MARITIME LAW
A Louisiana practitioner will most often deal with indemnification
agreements that are governed by either Louisiana, Texas, or maritime law based
105. Id. (citing Thurmond v. Delta Well Surveyors, 836 F.2d 952, 952 (5th Cir. 1988); Fontenot
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 791 F.2d 1207, 1214 (5th Cir. 1986); Corbitt v. Diamond M. Drilling Co.,
654 F.2d 329, 332 (5th Cir. 1981); O'Dell v. North River Ins. Co., 614 F. Supp. 1556, 1558 (W.D.
La. 1985); Hale v. Co-Mar Offshore Corp., 588 F. Supp. 1212, 1215 (W.D. La. 1984)).
106. Id
107. 979 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1992).
108. 993 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1993).
109. Campbell, 979 F.2d at 1126; Dupre, 993 F.2d at 476 n.4.
110. Campbell, 979 F.2d at 1126.
111. Dupre, 993 F.2d at 478.
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upon the location of the accident and/or choice-of-law stipulations in the
pertinent contracts.
Until 1987, Texas determined the enforceability of indemnity agreements
under the "clear and unequivocal" test expressed in Joe Adams & Son v. McCann
Construction Co.11 2  However, in Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Construction Co., 3
the Texas Supreme Court overruled Joe Adams & Son and its progeny. The
court noted a "plethora" of lawsuits resulting from the "clear and unequivocal"
test. It held the better policy was to eliminate ambiguity and adopt the "express
negligence test.'' 4
The test Texas courts use to determine whether an indemnity agreement is
enforceable consists of three elements derived from the Ethyl Corp. decision:
(1) the intent of the parties must be clear; (2) it must be set forth within the four
comers of the agreement; and (3) the specific intent of the parties must be
expressed." 5 Texas courts have interpreted many indemnity agreements under
the new three-prong test. The only indemnity agreements meeting the test and
requiring indemnification for an indemnitee's own negligence have expressly
referenced a form of the word "negligence."'"16
112. 475 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. 1971), overruled by Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d
705 (Tex. 1987).
113. 725 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1987).
114. Id. at 707-08.
115. Adams Resources Exploration Corp. v. Resource Drilling, Inc., 761 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988).
116. See, e.g., Maxus Exploration Co. v. Moran Bros., Inc., 817 S.W.2d 50, 56 (Tex. 1991)
(involving an indemnity clause that stated, "without limit and without regard to the cause or causes
thereof or the negligence of any party or parties" (emphasis added)); Enserch Corp. v. Parker, 794
S.W.2d 2, 6-7 (Tex. 1990) (involving an indemnity clause that stated, "regardless of whether, such
claims or actions are founded in whole or in part upon alleged negligence of [indemnitee]" (emphasis
added)); Payne & Keller, Inc. v. P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 956, 957 (Tex. 1990) (involving an
indemnity clause that stated, "arising out of ... the act or omissions ... of (indemnitor] or its...
employees ... in the performance of the work ... irrespective of whether [indemnitee] was
concurrently negligent" (emphasis added)); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Petroleum Personnel, Inc., 768
S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tex. 1989) (involving an indemnity clause that stated, "[indemnitor] agrees to...
indemnify... [indemnitee] ... in any matter arising from the work performed hereunder, including
but not limited to any negligent act or omission of [indemnitee]" (emphasis added)); Boyd v. Amoco
Prod. Co., 786 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (involving an indemnity clause that stated,
"whether or not such losses ... are occasioned by or incident to or the result of the negligence of
[indemnitee], its joint owner or owners, if any, and its agents" (emphasis added)); Amoco Oil Co.
v. Romaco, Inc., 810 S.W.2d 228, 229 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (involving an indemnity clause that
stated, "whether caused by a negligent act or omission of either party hereto" (emphasis added)); Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Tex., Inc., 782 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (involving
an indemnity clause that stated, "whether arising out of concurrent negligence on the part of
[indemnitee] or otherwise" (emphasis added)); Permian Corp. v. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 770
S.W.2d 928, 929 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (involving an indemnity clause which stated, "whether the
same is caused or contributed to by the negligence of [indemnitee], its agent or employees" (emphasis
added)); Adams Resources Exploration Corp. v. Resource Drilling, Inc., 761 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988) (involving an indemnity clause that stated, "without limit and without regard to the cause
or causes thereof or the negligence of any party or parties" (emphasis added)); B-F-W Constr. v.
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Many indemnity agreements have been held unenforceable because of what
the court perceives as "vague" language. Some examples of clauses held
unenforceable include:
(1) contractor agrees to indemnify and save harmless from any and all
loss sustained by owner by reason of damage to owner's property or
operations, and ... arising out of or in any way connected with or
attributable to the performance of or non-performance of work
hereunder by contractor...;117
(2) any loss ... as a result of operations growing out of the perfor-
mance of this contract and caused by the negligence or carelessness of
[indemnitor] ... ;
(3) for whose acts the Contractor [indemnitee] or the Subcontractor
[indemnitor] may be liable or for which the Subcontractor is liable or
responsible ... ;119
(4) from and against any and all damages, claims, demands and
expenses for or on account of damage of property or death of or injury
to any person or persons ... directly or indirectly arising out of, or
caused by, or in connection with the performance of or failure to
perform any work provided for hereunder by the Contractor [indemni-
tor] .. .;120
(5) Contractor and his surety will indemnify and fully save harmless
the City from any loss, damage or claim on account of any damages or
injuries .2..,'1
(6) against any and all action or causes of action, claims, demands,
liabilities, loss, damage, injury, cost or expense of whatever kind or
nature, . . . brought or presented by any person, firm, or corporation
Garza, 748 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (involving an indemnity clause that stated,
"regardless of cause or of any fault or negligence of contractor findemnitee]" (emphasis added)).
Additionally, indemnity clauses meeting the express negligence test under a federal court's
interpretation of Texas law have also included some form of the word "negligence." See, e.g., Dupre
v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 993 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 1993) (involving an indemnity clause that
stated, "[o]perator agrees to protect, defend, indemnify, and save Contractor... harmless from and
against all claims ... without regard to the cause or causes thereof or the negligence of any party
or parties" (emphasis added)); Patch v. Amoco Oil Co., 845 F.2d 571, 572 (5th Cir. 1988) (involving
an indemnity clause that stated, "seller agrees to indemnify and save buyer harmless from any loss,
damage or liability for injuries ... arising out of or in connection with the services ... whether
caused by negligence of either party" (emphasis added)); Dupont v. TXO Prod. Corp., 663 F. Supp.
56, 57 (E.D. Tex. 1987) (involving an indemnity clause that stated, "contractor agrees to protect,
defend, indemnify, and save operator... harmless from and against all claims.., of every kind and
character without limit and without regard to the cause or causes thereof or the negligence of any
party or parties" (emphasis added)).
117. Gulf Coast Masonry, Inc. v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 239, 239 (Tex. 1987).
118. Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. 1987).
119. Jobs Bldg. Serv., Inc. v. Rom, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
120. R.L. Jones Co. v. City of San Antonio, 809 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
121. City of Houston v. Goings, 795 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
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whatsoever, ... for injuries to or the death of any person, or damage
to or loss of property alleged or claimed to have been caused by, or to
have arisen out of or in connection with, or to be incidental to any of
the work... ;122
(7) from any liability or expense on account of property damage or
personal injury (including death resulting therefrom) sustained or alleged
to have been sustained by any person or persons .... arising out of or
in any way connected with or attributable to the performance or non-
performance of work hereunder by contractor.. ; 123 and
(8) from any and all claims, demands, liabilities, judgments, actions or
causes of action of any nature whatsoever ...."
Interestingly, the Texas Supreme Court has applied the "express negligence"
test retroactively to contracts entered into prior to the 1987 Ethyl Corp. decision.
Furthermore, the Texas Supreme Court even concluded a "sole negligence"
exception, such as "excepting only claims arising out of accidents resulting from
the sole negligence of [indemnitee]," did not meet the "express negligence"
test.1 25 The court stated the "sole negligence" exception merely indicates for
what the indemnitor was not responsible. 126 The clause did not indicate when
indemnity was required.
Louisiana's test for allowing recovery under a contract of indemnity for the
consequences of one's own negligence was clearly set out by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Polozola v. Garlock, Inc.127 The court held "such a contract
will not be construed to indemnify an indemnitee against losses resulting to him
through his own negligent act, unless such an intention was expressed in
unequivocal terms."' 28 This test seems analogous to the prior Texas rule of
"clear and unequivocal." The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal, following
the supreme court's ruling in Polozola, has described the Louisiana test as
follows in Wallace v. Slidell Memorial Hospital2 9 "An indemnity contract
will be construed to indemnify an indemnitee against losses resulting to him
122. Construction Inv. & Consultants, Inc. v. Dress Indus., Inc., 776 S.W.2d 790, 791 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1989).
123. Monsanto Co. v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass, Corp., 764 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988).
124. Linden-Alimak, Inc. v. McDonald, 745 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
125. Singleton v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 729 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex. 1987).
126. Id.
127. 343 So. 2d 1000 (La. 1977).
128. Id. at 1003 (citing Lee v. Allied Chem. Corp., 331 So. 2d 608 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 337 So. 2d 525 (1976); Strickland v. Nutt, 264 So. 2d 317 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused,
262 La. 1124, 266 So. 2d 432 (1972); Elephant, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 216 So. 2d
837 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968); Arnold v. Stupp Corp., 205 So. 2d 797 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967);
Jennings v. Ralston Purina Co., 201 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 251 La. 215, 203
So. 2d 554 (1967)).
129. 509 So. 2d 69 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
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partially through his own negligence where such intention is expressed in clear
and unequivocal terms."130  Both Polozola and Wallace determined that the
indemnity clauses in question satisfied the unequivocal standard. However, both
of the clauses also specifically referred to indemnification for the indemnitee's
negligent acts.
Language in recent federal cases interpreting Louisiana law suggests the
Louisiana test is less stringent than the current Texas mandate. In Amoco
Production Co. v. Forest Oil Corp.,131 the Fifth Circuit was applying Louisiana
law to interpret an indemnity agreement in a case in which the accident occurred
on the outer continental shelf. The court cited Polozola for Louisiana's general
rule and then stated:
[Louisiana's] rule does not require any "magic words" for an agreement
to cover the indemnitee's negligence, nor does it necessarily require an
express reference to "negligence" as such. But an agreement whereby
one party purportedly agrees to indemnify another against his negligence
must be strictly construed, and in the absence of clear, express, and
specific language plainly demonstrating that this was the parties'
intention, such an agreement will not be read to include the indemni-
tee's own negligence.
32
Under this test, an indemnity provision meeting the "express negligence" test in
Texas should also meet the Louisiana requirements. However, the converse will
not always be true.
The Fifth Circuit, in Randall v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,' recently clarified
what had been previously described as a distinction between maritime and
Louisiana law regarding interpretation of indemnity agreements. The Eastern
District of Louisiana determined in Randall that "Louisiana law requires more
specificity in indemnity clauses and is more restrictive in allowing indemnifica-
tion for an indemnitee's own negligence than maritime law."'34 In reversing
130. Id. at 74 (citing Polozola v. Garlock, Inc., 343 So. 2d 1000 (La. 1977); Robinson v. State,
454 So. 2d 257 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 458 So. 2d 122 (1984)) (emphasis added).
131. 844 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1988).
132. Id. at 254 (citations omitted). See Battig v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 482 F. Supp.
338, 343-44 (W.D. La. 1977), aff'd, 608 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1979), which additionally provided:
Louisiana does not require a specific reference to negligent acts in order for an indemnity
agreement or a release to cover claims based on negligent acts. However the intention
of the parties, as inferred from the language of their agreement, must clearly indicate an
intention to include negligent acts within the indemnity agreement or the release.
See also Knapp v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1123, 1127-28 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Incident
Aboard D/B Ocean King, 758 F.2d 1063, 1068 (5th Cir. 1985); Hyde v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 697
F.2d 614, 633 (5th Cir. 1983).
133. 13 F.3d 888 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Sea Savage, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 115
S. Ct. 498 (1994).
134. Randall v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1391, 1396 (E.D. La. 1992), rev'd in part,
13 F.3d 888 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Sea Savage, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 115 S. Ct.
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that part of the decision regarding indemnity provisions, the Fifth Circuit advised
that it was not convinced the district court was correct in assuming federal law
construed indemnity clauses more generously than Louisiana law. The appellate
court determined that many federal cases have held "[l]ong-established general
principles of interpreting indemnity agreements require that indemnification for
an indemnitee's own negligence be clearly and unequivocally expressed."'
135
After a brief discussion of the test applied under Louisiana law, the Fifth Circuit
found the applicable standard appeared to be the same under both Louisiana and
federal law-"clear and unequivocal."'
136
Of course, the Louisiana'3 and Texas 3 8 Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Acts
prohibit or restrict indemnification, as a matter of public policy, in certain
agreements pertaining to wells and relating to exploration, development,
production, or transportation of oil and gas. Obviously, there is a great deal of
case law that has been developed interpreting these Acts, which is beyond the
scope of this article.
In the lower court, Randall noted that maritime law has carved out only two
recognized instances where an indemnitee cannot seek indemnification for its
own negligence. First, contracts that release a towing company from all liability
arising out of services performed under the contract are prohibited. 39  The
other exception is the Section 905(b) prohibition, which precludes a vessel from
seeking indemnification from a longshore and harbor worker employer. 40
IV. LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT SECTIONS
905(B) AND (C)
The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)14 1
provides a restriction upon certain indemnity agreements, and an exception to
that restriction, which must be understood by the practitioner. Title 33, section
905(b), of the United States Code prohibits indemnification of a vessel by a
longshore and harbor worker employer. Section 905(b) provides, in pertinent
part:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by
the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise
498 (1994).
135. Randall, 13 F.3d at 905 (quoting Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 540 (5th Cir.
1986)) (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. See generally La. R.S. 9:2780 (1991).
138. See generally Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 127.003 (West 1993).
139. Randall v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1391, 1396 (E.D. La. 1992) (citing Bisso
v. Inland Waterway Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 90, 75 S. Ct. 629, 632 (1955)), rev'd in part, 13 F.3d 888
(5th Cir.), cert denied sub nora. Sea Savage, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 115 S. Ct. 498 (1994).
140. Id. at 1396-97 (citing Pippen v. Shell Oil Co., 661 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1981)).
141. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988).
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entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action
against such vessel as a third party in accordance with provisions of
section 933 of this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the
vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or
warranties to the contrary shall be void.'42
Notably, courts have not interpreted Section 905(b) to prohibit enforcement of
additional assured endorsements in favor of a vessel. 4 3  In 1984, Section
905(c) was enacted to provide an exception to the limitation of Section 905(b).
This exception allows enforcement of indemnification agreements in favor of the
vessel when employers and the vessel enter into a reciprocal indemnity
agreement. Section 905(c) provides:
Nothing contained in subsection (b) of this Section shall preclude the
enforcement according to its terms of any reciprocal indemnity
provision whereby the employer of a person entitled to receive benefits
under this chapter by virtue of Section 1333 of Title 43 and the vessel
agree to defend and indemnify the other for cost of defense and loss or
liability for damages arising out of or resulting from death or bodily
injury to their employees.'"
Campbell v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc.145 is the only Fifth Circuit case
to interpret what is to be considered a reciprocal indemnity provision under
Section 905(c). Again, in Campbell, Sonat had supplied a drilling vessel
pursuant to its contract with Union Texas Petroleum (UTP). Campbell, the
injured party, was an employee of Frank's Casing Crew (Frank's). Frank's had
contracted with UTP to defend and indemnify UTP and its contractors, but had
no agreement with Sonat. Sonat, the vessel, sought indemnity from Frank's, the
longshoreman's employer, as a third party beneficiary of the Frank's/UTP
contract. Frank's argued that there was no reciprocal indemnity provision
between the employer and the vessel, as there was no contract between Frank's
and Sonat.' 46 The Fifth Circuit disagreed.
The court noted Section 905(c) requires reciprocity between employers and
vessels, not privity.147 Furthermore, to explain how the reciprocity requirement
was met the court stated:
142. Id. § 905(b).
143. Voisin v. O.D.E.C.O. Drilling Co., 744 F.2d 1174, 1178 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1053, 105 S. Ct. 1757 (1985) (citing Price v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 616 F.2d 422, 428 (9th
Cir. 1980)).
144. 33 U.S.C. § 905(c) (1988).
145. 979 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1992).
146. Id. at 1117-18.
147. Id. at 1125.
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Although Sonat may not have agreed to directly indemnify Frank's
pursuant to the UTP-Frank's agreement, it did agree to do so pursuant
to the drilling contract entered into by Sonat and UTP. Specifically,
just as Frank's expressly agreed to indemnify Sonat and UTP's other
contractors for claims brought by Frank's employees, Sonat agreed to
hold Frank's and UTP's other contractors "harmless . ..."
In sum, Sonat and Frank's were brought together by UTP solely for
the purpose of carrying out UTP's oil-drilling operation. In contracting
with UTP, Frank's and Sonat explicitly agreed to indemnify each other,
and these agreements are unambiguous and completely reciprocal.'48
Accordingly, the court concluded that absolute privity between the vessel and the
employer was not required by Section 905(c). Sonat's and Frank's individual
agreements with UTP were sufficient to satisfy Section 905(c). In so holding,
the Fifth Circuit did not give strict credence to the Section 905(c) requirement
of "[a] reciprocal indemnity provision,"'49 whereby the employer and the vessel
agree to indemnify the other.
V. CO-INDEMNITY
Co-indemnity is another issue that often arises in the contractual indemnity
setting. This issue was also recently addressed by the Fifth Circuit in Campbell
v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc.'50 To assist the reader in understanding the
Campbell I decision, the following diagram of the contractual relationships
among the parties in Campbell II and the contractual relationships among the
parties in cases hereinafter discussed that were analyzed within Campbell II is
provided:
Campbell HI
UTP (indemnification
S,,for liability of
Sonat Frank's Sonat is at issue)
UTP contracted with Sonat to indemnify Sonat. Frank's separately
contracted with UTP and its contractors (i.e., Sonat). Frank's did not agree to
indemnify UTP for its contractual obligations to Sonat.
148. Id.
149. 33 U.S.C. § 905(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
150. 27 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 1994) (hereinafter Campbell I1). This is a separate, though related,
case from the Campbell case discussed supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text, notes 145-149 and
accompanying text.
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Hobbs"'
Chevron (indemnification
for liability of
Teledyne Oil Well Chevron is at
issue)
Teledyne and Oil Well each entered into separate contracts with Chevron
wherein each agreed to indemnify Chevron.
Corbitt'52
Shell
(indemnification
for liability of
Diamond M. Sladco Diamond M. is
at issue)
Shell contracted with Diamond M. to indemnify Diamond M. Sladco
separately contracted with Shell to indemnify Shell. Sladco did not agree to
indemnify Shell for its contractual obligation to Diamond M.
Lirette 11"3
Exxon (indemnification
N ,for liability of Otto
Popich - Otto Candies Candies is at issue)
Popich contracted with Otto Candies to indemnify Otto Candies and Exxon.
Otto Catdies contracted with Exxon to indemnify Exxon. Popich did not agree
to indemnify Otto Candies for its contractual obligation to Exxon.
In Campbell II, Frank's had been held liable to defend and indemnify Sonat
under Frank's contract with UTP. Frank's claimed that UTP was jointly liable
for any defense and indemnity obligation owed to Sonat by Frank's pursuant to
UTP's separate contract with Sonat, which also contained an indemnification
agreement in favor of Sonat. Frank's argued it and UTP were solidary obligors
151. Hobbs v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 632 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980).
152. Corbitt v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 654 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1981).
153. Lirette v. Popich Bros. Water Transp., Inc., 699 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1983) (hereinafter Liretre
I).
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of Sonat but, as between themselves, each was liable for only half.'54 Accord-
ingly, Frank's should be entitled to contribution from UTP.
The Fifth Circuit found Frank's reliance on Hobbs v. Teledyne Movible
Offshore, Inc.15  was misplaced. Hobbs was distinguishable in that both co-
indemnitors in Hobbs had contracted separately with the indemnitee. In contrast,
Frank's and UTP did not separately contract with Sonat. Frank's obligation to
indemnify Sonat arose out of the UTP-Frank's agreement, which included as
indemnitees any contractors secured by UTP-i.e., Sonat. The court felt any
application of Hobbs would overlook that Frank's obligation arose out of its
contract with UTP.1
56
Frank's further relied on Corbitt v. Diamond M. Drilling Co.'57 In Corbin,
the plaintiff was employed by Sladco. Sladco had contracted with Shell and
agreed to indemnify Shell "against all claims ... on account of personal
injury.' 5 Furthermore, Shell had separately contracted with Diamond M. and,
additionally, agreed to indemnify Diamond M. under this contract. The Fifth
Circuit determined that Sladco did not have to indemnify Shell for Shell's
liability to Diamond M. because Shell's liability to Diamond M. was not "on
account of personal injury. Rather, [Shell's liability to Diamond M. was] on
account of its agreement to indemnify Diamond M. under ... the
[Shell/Diamond M.] Contract."' 159 Likewise, Frank's argued UTP independent-
ly contracted with Sonat and the wording of the Frank'sIUTP indemnity
agreement was not broad enough to include UTP's contractual obligations to
Sonat.W
The Fifth Circuit cited one notable distinction between the two cases. In
Corbitt, Sladco did not agree to indemnify both Shell and Diamond M. in its
contract with Shell. However, as the court had previously concluded, the
Frank's/UTP clause did require Frank's to indemnify both UTP and Sonat.
154. Campbell 1I, 27 F.3d at 187 (citing Hobbs, 632 F.2d at 1241).
155. 632 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980).
156. Campbell II, 27 F.3d at 187.
157. 654 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1981).
158. Id. at 333.
159. Id.
160. The district court had concluded that in the Frank's/UTP agreement, Frank's expressly
agreed to indemnify UTP for UTP's contractual obligations. The Fifth Circuit disagreed by way of
footnote. The Fifth Circuit explained its analysis as follows:
A provision in an indemnity agreement adding a subcontractor as indemnitee has been
interpreted as providing indemnity of another's contractual indemnity exposure in
Foreman v. Exxon Corp. We do not consider the indemnity provision herein broad
enough to indemnify against contractual obligations, despite the inclusion of Sonat as an
indemnitee. The promise to indemnify against personal injuries is plainly intended to
encompass tortious, not contractual, injuries. Accordingly, we disagree with the district
court's holding that Frank's expressly agreed to indemnify UTP for UTP's contractual
obligations to Sonat. We reach the same result, however, as we also conclude that
Frank's contribution claim fails.
Campbell II, 27 F.3d at 188 n.4 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 55
SUSAN A. DAIGLE and JAMES T. RIVERA
Therefore, the court held Frank's could not "insulate itself from paying its full
indemnity obligation on the basis that [UTP's] liability to Sonat is contractu-
al." ' 6' In support of this determination, the court cited Lirette .
1
.162
Lirette 11 presents a similar contractual setting. In Lirette II, two parties had
been adjudged liable to Exxon for indemnification. Otto Candies was liable
under its contract with Exxon (just as UTP was liable to Sonat pursuant to its
contract). Additionally, Popich was liable because of its agreement with Otto
Candies to indemnify both Otto Candies and Exxon (just as Frank's was
obligated to defend and indemnify UTP and Sonat pursuant to the UTP/Frank's
agreement). Otto Candies sought indemnity from Popich. The Fifth Circuit
concluded that Otto Candies was entitled to indemnification from Popich,' 63 not
because of Otto Candies' contractual obligation to Exxon, but because of
Popich's own express relationship with Exxon through the Popich/Otto Candies
agreement.
The Lirette ll/Campbell II rule could perhaps best be stated as follows:
Where an indemnity agreement provides for indemnification of a principal and
its subcontractors, this indemnity obligation to the subcontractors supersedes any
separate obligation the principal may owe to these subcontractors by virtue of a
separate contract with the subcontractors. This is so despite the fact that the
contracts do not so stipulate.
The Lirette 11 decision may have dictated the end result in Campbell 11.
However, the result is that the UTP contract with Sonat is not given effect.
Arguably, UTP obligated itself just as clearly as did Frank's to indemnify Sonat.
We again note that in its August, 1994 Campbell 11 decision, the Fifth Circuit
expressly disagreed with the district court's holding that Frank's agreed to
indemnify UTP for UTP's contractual responsibility to Sonat. 4
Therefore, it appears a principal can effectively eliminate its contractual
liability to indemnify its contractors by entering into a separate contract with
another contractor in which that other contractor agrees to indemnify the
principal and its contractors.
161. Id. at 188 (citing Lirette v. Popich Bros. Water Transp., Inc., 699 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1983)).
162. 699 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1983).
163. The court explained its decision as follows:
Popich was not, as in Corbitt, being subjected to a liability arising from and imposed by
a completely separate contract between two outsiders. Rather, it was called upon to make
good its contractual obligation to hold Candies (and Exxon) harmless from claims, suits
or damage "arising out of, or in any way connected [with] the operation of the vessel
under this charter." Popich's obligation to reimburse Candies for amounts due Exxon
arose, not because of the separate agreement Candies had with Exxon, but because of
Popich's express undertaking to make good to Exxon all such losses. Candies['] acting
as a conduit did not alter that obligation.
Campbell 11, 27 F.3d at 188 (citing Lirene II, 699 F.2d at 728).
164. See supra text accompanying note 158.
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VI. WAIVERS OF SUBROGATION
Contracts that. include defense and indemnification and/or additional assured
endorsement provisions often also include requirements of waivers of subroga-
tion. Does a waiver of subrogation in a contract bar a claim for co-indemnity
against another based upon the theory of contribution? In other words, is a
contribution claim founded upon subrogation, and is that claim barred by a
broadly worded waiver of subrogation? This was an issue also raised in
Campbell II, but not reached by the court.
1 6
Maritime case law has not yet addressed this point in the contractual setting.
Maritime law has recognized a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors. In
Lanasse v. Travelers Insurance Co.,66 the Fifth Circuit held a waiver of
subrogation prevented a claim for reimbursement of settlement proceeds in a
situation where a vessel operator settled the plaintiff's tort claims against it and
then sought recovery from a non-settling defendant.161 Presumably, a contribu-
tion claim based upon contractual relationships would be the vehicle by which
co-indemnity is sought under maritime law. This contribution claim should be
considered founded upon the theory of subrogation.
Under Louisiana law, the answer appears clear. In Hobbs v. Teledyne
Movible Offshore, Inc.,68 the Fifth Circuit applied Louisiana Civil Code
articles 2091, 2103, and 2161 to reach the conclusion that under Louisiana law
contractual co-indemnitors are bound in solido.' 69 As between themselves,
each is liable for one-half of the debt, and one indemnitor can recover one-half
of the debt from the other by way of legal subrogation.
A broadly worded waiver of subrogation that does not limit itself, for
instance, to recovery of worker's compensation paid, should prohibit claims for
co-indemnity. Also, in situations where an insured has a large deductible or
retention, it would become significant whether the contract requires both the
insurer and the insured to waive subrogation.
VII. INSURANCE ISSUES
What policy or policies cover contractual indemnity claims? Contractual
coverage is traditionally purchased as part of a Comprehensive General Liability
(CGL) policy, and is also often provided for in Protection and Indemnify (P&I)
policies. In a situation where both CGL and P&I policies may apply, the CGL
policy may not cover the contractual indemnity at issue if the policy states it
does not provide any coverage to the extent a risk may be covered by a P&I
165. Appellee's Original Brief at 28, Campbell v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 27 F.3d 185 (5th
Cir. 1994) (No. 93-4893).
166. 450 F.2d. 580 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 921, 92 S. Ct. 1779 (1972).
167. Id. at 583.
168. 632 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980).
169. Id. at 1241-42.
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policy. Otherwise, the "other insurance" clauses of the two policies may
ultimately determine how the policies apply or are ranked.
The following hypothetical, involving Maritime Employer's Liability (MEL)
and CGL policies, illustrates other complicated insurance coverage issues that
may arise in the context of contractual indemnity in maritime law. Daigle, Inc.
(Daigle) contracts with Maraist, Inc. (Maraist) for Maraist to perform maritime
services offshore. Daigle requires Maraist to defend and indemnify Daigle and
to list Daigle as an additional assured under Maraist's MEL and CGL policies.
Those policies are required to provide primary coverage to Daigle. Additionally,
assume Maraist's employees are considered borrowed employees of Daigle.
As to the specific policies, assume that Maraist's MEL and CGL policies
provide Daigle with additional assured status and are stated to be primary in
relation to Daigle's own policies. Likewise, the MEL policy contains an
alternate employer endorsement, and the CGL policy's employee exclusion is not
deleted and is enforceable. Finally, the CGL policy provides coverage for any
contractual indemnity owed to Daigle by Maraist.
The facts regarding the hypothetical claim are as follows. The plaintiff is
an employee of Maraist and is a seaman. After being injured while working on
the Maraist/Daigle project, he sues both Maraist and Daigle. He claims that
Daigle is his borrowing employer. Which policy or policies should cover the
claim against Daigle?
Plaintiff's claim against Daigle based upon seaman status will be covered by
Maraist's MEL policy. The MEL underwriter acknowledges coverage, but
claims it "steps into the shoes" of Daigle and can pursue Daigle's claim against
Maraist for contractual indemnity. Can Maraist's MEL underwriters shift the
Jones Act exposure of Daigle to Maraist's CGL underwriters by asserting
Daigle's. contractual indemnity rights against Maraist because contractual
indemnity is covered by Maraist's CGL policy?
The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held an insurer may not sue its own insured
to receive any part of its payment for a risk covered by the policy.170 This
principle should not be applicable to the instant hypothetical because MEL
underwriters are asserting its insured's rights against another party which happens
to also be insured by MEL underwriters. Likewise, MEL underwriters should
not be considered in violation of Lanasse v. Travelers Insurance Co.,17 1 which
provided that an insurer could not recover by way of subrogation against its
insured. Again, MEL underwriters are seeking recovery from Maraist by way
of subrogation to Daigle's rights. That Maraist happens to also be insured by
MEL underwriters should be of no moment.
A recent Fifth Circuit decision addressed another issue that often arises in
the maritime contractual setting-the extent to which a P&I policy may provide
170. See Peavey Co. v. M/V ANPA, 971 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1992); Dow Chem. Co. v. M/V
Roberta Tabor, 815 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1987).
171. 450 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1971).
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additional assured coverage to a time charterer of a vessel. In Randall v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,' the Fifth Circuit held a P&I policy naming Chevron
(time charterer) as an additional assured covered Chevron's negligence to the
extent that Chevron negligently exercised its right to direct the movement of the
vessel. The court believed this theory of liability fell within the terms of the
P&I policy that covered "all such loss .. .the Assured shall as owners of the
vessel ... have become liable to pay."
VIII. APPEAL OF RULINGS ON MARITIME CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY CLAIMS
Campbell II dealt with yet another issue critical to contractual indemnity
litigation: When is a ruling that addresses the contractual rights of the parties
appealable? The court determined the ruling dismissing Frank's and Underwrit-
ers' cross claims for co-indemnity against UTP was an interlocutory order in an
admiralty case determining the rights and liabilities of the parties such that 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) applied. The ruling therefore would become immediately
appealable. 74  In Stoot v. Fluor Drilling Services, Inc.,75 the Fifth Circuit
had previously held an order enforcing a contractual defense and indemnification
provision was immediately appealable, and the appeal must be filed within thirty
(30) days under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1).
IX. CONCLUSION
Some of the more clearly defined principles applied in the maritime
contractual indemnity setting have been discussed. However, as is implicit in
much of the discussion, many issues addressed in the context of interpretation
and application of contractual indemnification obligations remain open for
argument and further delineation. Stability and consistency in applying rules that
govern contractual relationships is an admirable goal pursued by all jurists who
address these legal issues. However, this goal has not necessarily been
accomplished in many of the above defined areas.
This article makes no effort to resolve the issues addressed, but may serve
to highlight some potential problem areas and areas of concern that must be dealt
with by many maritime law practitioners. The future promises to bring further
twists and turns in this interesting and complicated area of the law.
172. 13 F.3d 888 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 498 (1994).
173. Id. at 907.
174. Campbell v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 27 F.3d 185, 187 n.3 (5th Cir. 1994).
175. 851 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir. 1988).
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